State of Utah v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1958
State of Utah v. Denver and Rio Grande Western
Railroad Co. : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
E. R. Callister; Walter L. Budge; Wallace R. Kelly; Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., No. 8754 (Utah Supreme Court, 1958).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2962
F I L E [ 
JUN 1 71958 
·---------~·----------............................................. :-------
Court, Utah 
In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah ~ 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its 
ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
DENVER AND RIO GRANDE WEST-
ERN RAILROAD COMPANY, a Del-
aware corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
~7}\\'.c ~~/- ~ \~sco 
\)<:,;_\.,\. # 
~~ 
Case No. 
8414 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Deputy Attorney General, 
WALLACE B. KELLY, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
A.ftROW ft11188, 8ALT LAKI 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ....................... 3-4 
ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE 
OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES SOUGHT 
TO BE CONDEMNED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
POINT II. APPELLANT HAS A MORE NECES-
SARY PUBLIC USE OF THE PREMISES 
SOUGHT TO BE CONDEMNED THAN HAS 
RESPONDENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
CONCLUSION ........... . 
CASES CITED 
Alberton Southern Railway Co. v. State Highway 
Dept. of Georgia (1955), 211 Ga. 838, 89 S. E. 
2d 645 .... 
Delaware and Hudson R. R. Cor., 254 N.Y. S. 578 .... 
Denver & Rio Grande R. R. Co. v. Denver, 250 U. S. 242 
Electric Power Board of City of Nashville v. Thoni 
(1947), 184 Tenn. 459, 201 S. W. 2d 649 . 
Home Gas Company v. Kuruc, 132 N. Y. S. 2d 316 
State ex rei. Eastvold v. Superior Court of State, 
Skagit Co., et al. (1954), 44 Wash. 2d 607, 269 
P. 2d 560 . . ...... . 
State ex rei. Washington Power Co. v. Superior 
Court, 8 Wash. 2d 131, 132, 111 P. 2d 577 .. 
9 
9 
7 
7 
7 
7 
8 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued 
State Road Commission v. Franklin (1953), 201 Md. 
549, 95 A. 2d 99 . . . . .................. . 
State v. Superior Court (1947), 28 Wash. 2d 476, 183 
P. 2d 802 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ 
Town Superintendent of Highway of Frankfurt, 87 
N. Y. S. 2d 453, 194 Misc. 732 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah State Constitution, Section 12, Art. XII . . . 5 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953: 
Section 78-34-4 
Section 78-34-9 
5 
5,8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its 
ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
DENVER AND RIO GRANDE WEST-
ERN RAILROAD COMPANY, a Del-
aware corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
8754 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an interlocutory appeal made from an order of 
the Third District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, de-
nying the appellant's motion for an Order of Immediate 
Occupancy to respondent's property sought to be condemned 
(R. 93). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The material facts in this matter are not in substantial 
dispute. Generally, the situation is this: A north to south 
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interstate freeway has been projected which, when con-
structed, will be adjacent to and east of the Denver and 
Rio Grande Main line running through the City of Midvale. 
Under the Federal Highway Act of 1956, there can be no 
crossing of streets or railroads at grade with the highway. 
The appellant must either underpass the proposed freeway 
and mainline crossing Center Street or overpass the branch 
spur at Center Street. The present plans propose to under-
pass the main line and the freeway at the intersection with 
Center Street (R. 31). 
The Little Cottonwood Branch serves two customers 
east of State Street at a gross revenue of $21,500 (R. 28-
29) . Two or more customers are served from a team track 
which will handle approximately ten carloads of freight 
per year (R. 82). The branch line in question has an 
assessed valuation of $6,525.00 (R. 36). 
Shortly after the interstate route throughout the na-
tion was considered in 1948, it was determined that the 
most feasible and most desirable route through Salt Lake 
County is the one now projected (R. 63-64). If an over-
pass over Center Street and the branch spur in question 
is constructed, an undesirable condition will result leaving 
a grade crossing with restricted sight distance due to the 
overpass structure (R. 48-54). It would be most desirable 
rather than to spend the money for an overpass over Center 
Street to provide an underpass under the freeway and the 
mainline, thereby eliminating the hazard of crossing for 
the large volume of traffic using Center Street ( 8,000 ve-
hicles per day) (R. 58). 
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Funds are now programmed for the design of the 
highway from Draper crossroads to Ninth North. Until 
it is known what type of structures will be required, de-
signs cannot be prepared and right-of-way lines cannot be 
established since an overpass structure at Center Street 
would require wider rights-of-way due to the slopes of the 
approach piers (R. 51). 
The State has now purchased 51% of the right-of-way 
between 7200 and 9000 South through the City of Midvale 
at a cost of $277,000 plus (R. 33). 
The freeway is programmed for construction within 
three to five years, and these plans cannot be completed 
until we know the disposition of this lawsuit (R. 39-41). 
After the route and all design features are definitely es-
tablished due to a number of structures involved, it would 
take from one to two years minimum to design these struc-
tures and acquire necessary rights-of-way. We are now 
constructing an overpass at the north end of the county 
(R. 51). 
State Project 1580 calls for the widening of Center 
Street, and coincidental therewith obtaining the railroad 
right-of-way through Center Street. Rail traffic through 
Center Street amounts to approximately 80 railroad cars 
per year ( R. 82-83) . 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPEL-
LANT'S MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE OCCU-
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P ANCY OF THE PREMISES SOUGHT TO BE 
CONDEMNED. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT HAS A MORE NECESSARY 
PUBLIC USE OF THE PREMISES SOUGHT 
TO BE CONDEMNED THAN HAS RESPON-
DENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPEL-
LANT'S MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE OCCU-
PANCY OF THE PREMISES SOUGHT TO BE 
CONDEMNED. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT HAS A MORE NECESSARY 
PUBLIC USE OF THE PREMISES SOUGHT 
TO BE CONDEMNED THAN HAS RESPON-
DENT. 
The Order appealed from reads in part as follows: 
"And the Court being fully advised in the prem-
ises now finds that the evidence introduced at said 
hearing is insufficient to justify the issuance of an 
order permitting the plaintiff to immediately occupy 
the premises sought to be condemned pending the 
action." 
The question to be determined by this appeal is whether 
appellant has an immediate need for occupancy of the prop-
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erty for a more necessary public use than respondent. For 
the sake of brevity, both points will be argued as one. 
Section 12 of Article XII of the Utah State Constitu-
tion provides : 
"All railroad and other transportation compan-
ies are declared to be common carriers and subject 
to legislative control * * * " 
The Legislature has seen fit under Section 78-34-9, of the 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, to enact the following section 
of our statute : 
"Occupancy of premises pending action. The 
plaintiff may move the court or a judge thereof, at 
any time after the commencement of suit on notice 
to the defendant * * * for an order permitting 
the plaintiff to occupy the premises sought to be 
condemned pending the action and to do such work 
thereon as may be required for the easement sought 
according to its nature. The court or a judge thereof 
shall take proof by affidavit or otherwise of the 
value of the premises sought to be condemned and 
of the damages which will accrue from the condem-
nation, and of the reasons for requiring a speedy 
occupation, and shall grant or refuse the motion ac-
cording to the equity of the case and the relative 
damages which may accrue to the parties * * *" 
Section 78-34-4, U. C. A. 1953, provides in part as follows: 
"Before property can be taken it must appear: 
* * * 
"(3) If already appropriated to some public 
use, that the public use to which it is to be applied 
is a more necessary use." 
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There are two projects involved in this matter, one 
being the widening and improvement of Center Street in 
Midvale ; the other the construction of a grade separation 
structure at a point where the proposed freeway crosses 
Center Street in Midvale. In order to complete the project, 
condemnation of the right-of-way of the Little Cottonwood 
Branch Line of the Denver and Rio Grande Western Rail-
road Company is sought. 
The freeway is in the planning stage. Land is being 
purchased for the right-of-way at a great cost to the tax-
payers. If an overpass structure at the intersection of 
Center Street were built, it would not only be erected at a 
great cost, but would be a perpetual hazard to motorists 
traveling Center Street. 
The spur and branch line of respondent is used but 
very little under existing circumstances and conditions. The 
assessed valuation is nominal and the revenue is very small. 
The daily traffic of 8,000 vehicles through Center Street 
as against the branch line of the Railroad being used only 
occasionally for the transportation of approximately 80 
carloads of material per year over its line at a total gross 
revenue to the Railroad Company of approximately $25,-
000.00 indicates the higher use which appellant desires to 
put respondent's property. The most feasible plan to con-
struct the highway in conformity to the Federal Highway 
Act of 1956 would be to underpass the Denver and Rio 
Grande Western mainline and the freeway at the intersec-
tion of Center Street in Midvale. It will take from one to 
two years to fully plan the structures and the design of 
the highway so it is necessary to obtain immediate occu-
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pancy of the property involved in this action to accomplish 
the speedy construction of the highway. 
This is not a unique case and we find that almost uni-
versally under statutes similar to ours when necessity for 
immediate occupancy for a higher public use arises, a mo-
tion for immediate occupancy should be granted by the 
court. 
In the case of the Delaware and Hudson Railroad Cor-
poration v. The Public Service Commission, 254 N. Y. S. 
578, the order of the Public Service Commission directing 
construction of underpass was held to be authorized though 
it was incidental to a taking of the railroad yards and 
would destroy the use of the property. 
In the case of the Town Superintendent of Highways 
of Frankfurt, cited in 87 N.Y. S. 2d 453, 194 Misc. 732, the 
court held that if the public interest were prejudiced by 
delay, immediate occupancy pending the proceedings is 
proper. See also Home Gas Company v. Kuruc, 132 N. Y. S. 
2d 316. Where protection is further provided against loss or 
damages as may be finally awarded, the condemnor is en-
titled to immediate entry, Electric Power Board of the City 
of Nashville v. Thoni, (Tenn. 1947), 184 Tenn. 459, 201 S. 
w. 2d 649. 
In the case of the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad 
Company v. the City of Denver, 250 U. S. 242, the court 
held that a city ordinance directing removal of tracks from 
the city street was not assailable where resulting expense 
and loss of revenue would be relatively small and no longer 
essential to the Railroad Company. 
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In discussing the question of more necessary public 
use we call the Court's attention to the case of The State v. 
Superior Court, 28 Wash. 2d 476, 183 P. 2d 802, decided in 
1947. In that case the Supreme Court cited the case of the 
State ex rel. Washington Water Power Co. V. Superior 
Court, 8 Wash. 2d 131, 132, 111 P. 2d 577, wherein the 
Court stated : 
"A municipal corporation may be given the right 
by the legislature to condemn and take the property 
of a privately owned public utility corporation al-
ready devoted to the same public use, the reason that 
the use of the public utility by a municipal corpora-
tion is larger in scope and a more general benefit 
to the public." (Cases cited.) 
In the case of the State ex rel. Eastvold v. Superior 
Court of State, Skagit County, et al., 44 Wash. 2d 607, 269 
P. 2d 560, decided in 1954, the trial court dismissed the 
petition of the State of Washington in eminent domain pro-
ceedings in which the state sought to appropriate the right-
of-way of Drainage District No. 17, a municipal corpora-
tion in Skagit County for the purpose of converting exist-
ing primary State Highway No. 1 to a four lane limited 
access highway. The Court unanimously held that the 
State highway authorities could condemn property of munic-
ipal corporations already in public use as long as the con-
demnation proceedings were in good faith and not of an 
arbitrary, capricious or fraudulent nature on the part of 
the State highway authorities. 
Under a statute somewhat similar to 78-34-9, U~ C. A. 
1953, supra, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, State's 
Road Commission v. Franklin, 201 Md. 549, 95 A. 2d 99 
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(1953), the court held that the State Road Commission had 
authority to enter upon the property prior to condemnation 
when necessary to speedy accomplishment of highway con-
struction. 
In the case of Alberton Southern Railway Co. v. State 
Highway Department of Georgia, 211 Ga. 838, 89 S. E. 2d 
645 ( 1955), a condemnation proceeding by the State High-
way Department was commenced against the railway to 
obtain part of the railroad's right-of-way for public road 
purposes. In that case the Court held that where the State 
was acting through its duly constituted agency, it had para-
mount authority in the matter of taking any property 
within its boundaries for those public uses to which it 
might reasonably devote such property, including that which 
had already been devoted to a different public use and 
therefore could condemn a portion of the railroad right-of-
way for public road purposes. 
CONCLUSION 
It is the contention of the plaintiff and appellant in 
this matter that there is an immediate necessity for the 
taking of the property involved for the reason that it will 
take from one to two years to plan and design structures 
for the highway program as outlined under the Federal 
Highway program of 1956. This is rather a question of 
fact and from all the evidence contained in the record it 
appears to the appellant that not only does the appellant 
have a higher and better use for the property involved, 
but that it has an immediate need for occupancy. The Rail-
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road Company is amply provided for in the way of dam-
ages, if any, and on the other hand, the State of Utah is 
being greatly handicapped by not being able to prepare, 
design and determine the necessary structures that will 
be involved in the course of the construction of the free-
way. The use to which the State seeks to put the right-of-
way of the D. & R. G. Railroad Company is larger in scope 
and has a more general benefit to the public than the spur 
line of the Railroad Company. We think the Court erred 
in denying the application of appellant for immediate occu-
pancy in view of the evidence adduced and that it abused 
its discretion in denying such application and that such 
order appealed from should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Deputy Attorney General, 
WALLACE B. KELLY, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Att01~ys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
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